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Many of the deaths prevented by environmental law are deaths that
would have occurred many years hence. This is usually because the disease
that would have killed people has a long latency period, or because the
people exposed to the regulated hazard did not even exist at the time
regulation was imposed. How do these future deaths compare to deaths that
occur today? I believe that the resolution of this question depends on our
moral commitments to each other's future selves and to future people. It
does not turn on financial rates of return, and resort to such figures will
obscure rather than illuminate the relevant concerns.
In defending discounting as a means of choosing between present and
future life, John Donohue elides the moral issues inherent in discounting by
making two assumptions. First, he says, discounting does not devalue future
life relative to present life (p. 1906).' Second, he believes that there is no
difference between discounting money and discounting life (p. 1905).
These assumptions are mistaken.
Donohue asserts that discounting in the context of lifesaving regulation
is not about valuing future life less than present life, but about the
productive capacity of money over time: "I[I]f invested, our resources are
expected to grow at [the current rate of interest], so that if we forgo
spending and invest the money instead, we can save more lives in the future
with the amount foregone today" (p. 1905). In his example, we might spend
$40 million today to save ten lives seven years from now, or we could
invest the $40 million at an interest rate of ten percent and thus have $80
million in seven years, which would enable us to save more than the ten
lives we could save today (p. 1905). This assumes that the cost of saving
lives increases at a rate lower than the discount rate-a dubious premise
that Donohue does not acknowledge, let alone defend.
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But just think: If, seven years from now, we invest the money again
rather than spend it on lifesaving, in another seven years we will have
accumulated $160 million and can then save even more lives. If we then
wait another seven years to spend the money, we will have $320 million.
And so on. Donohue does not tell us how to decide when to stop investing
and when to start saving lives. If his analysis is accepted, we will keep our
money in the bank forever.
Others have concluded that the only way out of this spiral is to value
future lives less than present ones.2 They have recognized what Donohue
does not: Discounting lives is all about the relative worth of lives today
versus lives tomorrow.3 It is puzzling, then, that Donohue insists that "no
one suggests that lives should be discounted in the popular meaning of that
term-devalued or disregarded" (p. 1908). This claim is all the more
confusing given his belief in the equivalence of money and life. Money is
discounted precisely because tomorrow's dollar is worth less than today's.
If life is equivalent to money, its value also must decline with time.4
This brings us to Donohue's second premise, that there is no difference
between discounting money and discounting life. However, both the timing
and the nature of the regulatory benefits at stake depend on whether the
benefits are represented as dollars or as lives.
The timing of regulatory benefits is critical to the issue of discounting.
Discounting comes into play only when there is a temporal lag between
costs and benefits. If benefits occur roughly contemporaneously with costs,
there is no need to convert costs and benefits to common temporal terms
and thus no need to discount. The decision to discount therefore turns not
only on whether the appropriate discount rate is zero or some positive
number, but also on when costs and benefits occur. Like most people who
2. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), for example, has written:
Suppose that the resources that would otherwise be used today to achieve a given result
could be invested at a positive rate of return (that is, at the discount rate). By forgoing
the expense this year and investing the resources at the discount rate, society could
spend more next year (by a proportion equal to the discount rate) and achieve a higher
level of welfare. As long as society places the same value on a unit of future benefits as
a unit of current benefits (i.e., it does not discount), it will be better off by delaying the
action ad infinitum.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1990-MARCH 31, 1991, at 40 (1990) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses,
Review Draft, at E-29 (July 17, 1998) [ hereinafter EPA Guidelines].
4. This is not to say that valuing future life less than present life is the only way to avoid
endless reinvestment of regulatory resources. Regulators do not have the freedom to invest rather
than regulate. Legally, there is no mechanism allowing federal agencies to do this. Politically,
imagine the public's reaction if the administrator of the EPA announced she had decided to invest
the money at her disposal so that, at some unknown future date, another EPA administrator could
start saving lives, and then, when that day came, the next administrator, too, decided to put off
lifesaving in favor of investing. The notion that discounting is the only way to prevent regulators
from keeping their money in the bank forever is ridiculous.
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discuss discofinting, Donohue focuses all of his attention on the first
question and none on the second.
Many economists believe that the appropriate way to monetize the
benefits of lifesaving interventions is to ask how much individuals are
willing to pay to reduce their own risks of death.' These "willingness-to-
pay" studies do not measure the ultimate value a person places on her own
life; they measure only the value she places on an increased risk of death.
Thus, where the value of lifesaving measures is reported in dollars, the
dollars reflect a benefit conferred as of the moment risk is reduced. In most
cases the reduction in risk will occur roughly contemporaneously with the
expenditure of costs to reduce it. In such cases, discounting is not an issue.
Where lifesaving benefits are reported in dollars, therefore, the issue of
discounting often evaporates due to timing alone. Donohue can believe that
it does not matter whether regulatory benefits are measured in lives or
dollars (pp. 1905-06) only because he does not seem to appreciate that the
dollars in question do not represent lives, but only risk.
The nature of lifesaving benefits also depends on how they are
reported. Analysts sometimes report regulatory benefits in terms of lives
saved, and discount lives rather than dollars, not due to mere
"happenstance," as Donohue suggests (p. 1906), but out of squeamishness
about equating life with dollars. Indeed, the cost-per-life-saved approach
adopted by John Morrall in his famous table6 has emerged as an alternative
to cost-benefit analysis partly due to controversies about monetizing human
life. Discounting dollars and discounting lives may be "mathematically
equivalent" (p. 1905), but they are not morally equivalent. If we decline to
represent lives as dollars for purposes of valuing the lives, then we should
not pretend the lives are dollars for purposes of discounting. Analysts
could, however, exploit the mathematical equivalence of discounting lives
and discounting dollars in order to give force to an unstated normative
assumption that lives are fungible with dollars. If Donohue wants more
honest regulatory analysis, this is not the way to achieve it.
If anything, the debate over discounting shows the oddity of treating
human lives as fungible with dollars. The person who "invests" in her
future by quitting smoking or exercising regularly will be disappointed if
she expects that by doing so she will gain more than one life to live. Lives
do not compound the way money does. Nor do they disaggregate the same
way. Discounting lives the way we discount money implies that a death in
the future is not a whole death, but only part of one. Needless to say, this
defies the human experience of death.
5. See, e.g., W. KIP ViscusI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC & PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 18 (1992).
6. John F. Morrall H, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 25, 30 tbl.4.
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Reporting the benefits of lifesaving programs in dollars rather than
lives has an ironic consequence: It decreases the influence of discounting
on estimates of these benefits. A positive discount rate reflects an
expectation of productivity growth, which will increase future wages,
which will increase willingness to pay for decreased risk.7 Where lifesaving
benefits are reported in dollars, estimates of future benefits must be
increased relative to present benefits due to the same assumptions that
underlie discounting itself.5 If the monetary valuation of future lifesaving
benefits is done properly, therefore, discounting "should not drastically
affect the attractiveness of policies with long-term implications." 9 Where
benefits are reported in lives, estimates of future productivity growth do not
affect the estimates of benefits. Thus, estimates of future benefits will
effectively be lower when benefits are reported in lives, and, as my analysis
of John Morrall's table showed, discounting will drastically affect the
attractiveness of lifesaving programs if benefits are reported in lives.
Only by assuming that lives are fungible with dollars can Donohue
proceed to treat the choice of discount rate as an accountant's problem.
Knotty questions abound (p. 1906): How should corporate income taxes
figure into discount rate estimation? What about private risk premiums for
financial investments? Where does the rate of return on riskless government
bonds fit in? To Donohue's rather dated list of concerns, one might add
others from more recent literature on discounting: Is hyperbolic discounting
more appropriate than constant exponential discounting?" What is the
shadow price of capital?" Is the economy "open" or "closed" ?12
The trouble is: What does any of this have to do with the relative value
of present and future life? The irrelevance of the rate of return on
government bonds to the relative worth of present and future people seems
clear enough; to say that our moral obligations to others decline, lockstep,
with temporal distance is, as Derek Parfit has observed,13 no more sensible
than saying they decline with spatial distance. But even where the lives are
our own, it seems implausible to insist that financial rates of return describe
how we value our future health. Imagine the person who, before quitting
smoking, first considered whether the Federal Reserve might soon raise or
7. Viscusi, supra note 5, at 145.
8. Donohue thinks it "illogical" (1908 n.32) to spend more to save the lives of the rich than
the lives of the poor, but this is only the illogic of his own accounting methods: Where value is
measured by willingness to pay, the rich not only get richer, they get safer, too.
9. Viscusi, supra note 5, at 145.
10. See, e.g., Norman Henderson & Ian Bateman, Empirical and Public Choice Evidence for
Hyperbolic Social Discount Rates and the Implications for Intergenerational Discounting, 5
ENvrL. & RESOURCE ECON. 413 (1995).
11. See, e.g., EPA Guidelines, supra note 3, at E-1 Ito E-12.
12. See, e.g., id. at E-15 to E-16.
13. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 482 (1984).
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lower interest rates. Wouldn't that person seem a little crazy? Yet this is the
kind of reasoning implied by John Donohue's approach to the future.
Donohue and I agree on an important point: Judgment is an
unavoidable part of the administrative process (p. 1908). Donohue believes
that our judgment about present and future lifesaving is best informed by
the generation of numbers based on financial rates of return. I believe that
we should proceed straight to judgment, and skip the quantitative stage
where it produces numbers that do not address the issues at hand.
Generating numbers that are ultimately irrelevant to the questions to be
resolved does more than waste precious regulatory resources. It changes the
apparent nature of the decision itself, and permits politics and ideology to
hide behind a mask of technical expertise.
Most people cringe at the logical implications of willingness-to-pay and
discounting: The lives of the poor are less valuable than the lives of the
rich, and lives in the future are less valuable than lives today. So many
people who embrace these methodologies scramble, like Donohue, to
reconcile the equal moral worth of all persons with their professional
commitments to cost-benefit analysis. In their scrambling they err.
In explaining why willingness-to-pay does not value the lives of the
rich more highly than the lives of the poor, for example, Donohue silently
transforms this methodology from a measurement of one's own willingness
to pay for the protection of one's own health into a measurement of one's
willingness to pay for the protection of the health of others (p. 1909). But
the premise of willingness-to-pay is that the ones doing the paying are also
the ones doing the dying. Asking one group of people what they are willing
to pay to protect the health of another group of people just aggravates the
very externality one is trying to measure.
Likewise, in striving to reconcile discounting with the equal moral
worth of all persons, Donohue explains that just as he does not worry about
his neighbor's children because his neighbor can take care of them, so he
does not worry about future generations because they, too, will be able to
take care of themselves (p.1910). This explanation, again, ignores the very
externality discounting attempts to measure. I am certain that Donohue
would not dump toxic waste in his neighbors' yard, foul their drinking
water, denude their landscape-and blithely explain that his doing so did
not devalue his neighbors' moral worth because they could take care of
themselves.
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